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Abstract
White box adversarial perturbations are sought via iterative optimization algorithms most often
minimizing an adversarial loss on a `p neighborhood of the original image, the so-called distortion set.
Constraining the adversarial search with different norms results in disparately structured adversarial
examples. Here we explore several distortion sets with structure-enhancing algorithms. These new
structures for adversarial examples, yet pervasive in optimization, are for instance a challenge for adversarial
theoretical certification which again provides only `p certificates. Because adversarial robustness is still
an empirical field, defense mechanisms should also reasonably be evaluated against differently structured
attacks. Besides, these structured adversarial perturbations may allow for larger distortions size than
their `p counter-part while remaining imperceptible or perceptible as natural slight distortions of the
image. Finally, they allow some control on the generation of the adversarial perturbation, like (localized)
bluriness.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning classifiers designed to cause the model to misclassify.
These are searched in the vicinity of some dataset samples, typically in their norm-ball neighborhoods, the
so-called distortion set. When replacing every test set samples with their associated sought for adversarial
examples, the accuracy of classically trained classifiers quickly drops to zero as a function of the considered
norm-ball radius. This lack of robustness challenges the security of some real-world systems as well as
questions the neural classifiers generalizing properties [Schmidt et al., 2018, Stutz et al., 2019].
This has hence sired a series of works proposing attacks or defenses methods (both practical or theoretical).
Most of the attack and defense mechanisms considered `p neighborhoods. While some recent papers [Xu
et al., 2018, Wong et al., 2019] pointed out the benefits of other families of distortions sets, as well as others,
outlined the inherent limitations of the `p balls [Sharif et al., 2018, Sen et al., 2019], many classical norm
families remained mostly unexplored in the adversarial setting.
In the white-box framework, the attacker has access to backward passes on the model. Adversarial
examples are then iterates of optimization algorithms that seek to minimize constrained adversarial losses.
Although norms are equivalent in the image finite-dimensional space, the type of norm-ball influences the
structure of the optimization algorithm iterates as well as the (local) minima to which they seek to converge.
In such an empirical field, it is hence essential to explore the effect of particular structures in adversarial
perturbation besides `p balls, see Figure 1 for an example.
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For instance, it may perfectly be that some empirical defense mechanisms leverage on the lack of a certain
pattern in the adversarial perturbation. Providing a catalog of many structured attacks would then at least
warn us against such a possibility.
(a) FGSM (b) With nuclear ball
Figure 1: The images correspond to two types of targeted attacks. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) solve
(1) constrained by a `∞ ball while FWnucl solves (1) constrained with a nuclear ball. The type of adversarial
perturbations differs significantly in structure.
The radius of the convex balls is often taken small enough to ensure that the adversarial perturbations are
imperceptible. This imperceptibility requirement is pervasive in the literature, although it is far from being
the only regime for adversarial examples [Gilmer et al., 2018, §2] leading to security issues. Adversarial
examples also challenge the generalization properties of classifiers. However, the imperceptibility of the
distortion does not play a special role in that respect, especially when the ideal level of perturbation is arguably
the one that guarantees that the labeled content of the original image is preserved (for a human observer) in
the adversarially perturbed image. Actually, the imperceptible deformation regime of non-robust classifiers
has arguably received much attention because it highlights the limitation of the analogy between human
perception and the processing done by machine learning systems [Gilmer et al., 2018]. Not being able to
overcome this issue would then challenge the belief that current neural networks are possible models of some
biological brains.
Here, we do not limit ourselves to the imperceptible regime of perturbation. Instead, we explore
adversarial examples’ structure leading to possibly perceptible deformations that would yet be considered as
non-suspicious alteration of the image. For instance, the nuclear ball, which is the convex relaxation of matrix
rank, qualitatively leads to blurred versions of the initial image. This blurring effect could be easily localized
to specific semantic areas in the image simply by considering the group-nuclear ball distortion set, where the
groups are defined accordingly.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on un-targeted adversarial examples via the classical optimization
approach with respect to x
minimize L(f(x), t)
subject to ||x− xori|| ≤ 
where L is an adversarial loss, f the neural classifier and t a label different from the label of the original
image xori.
Related Work. Several works question the reason for considering `p neighborhood as distortion sets and
propose other models and methods. For instance, Sharif et al. [2018] suggest that `p norms are neither the
right metric for perceptually nor even content-preserving adversarial examples. Sen et al. [2019] show on a
behavioral study that that `p norms and some other metrics do not fit with human perception.
Others consider adversarial perturbations beyond the `p distortion sets. Engstrom et al. [2017] show that
simple rotation and translation can be efficient adversarial methods. Xu et al. [2018] consider group-lasso
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distortion sets to latter interpret some adversarial example properties, solving the optimization problem via
ADMM. Liu et al. [2018] generate adversarial examples based on the geometry and physical rendering of the
image. They notably suggest that large pixel perturbations can be realistic if the perturbation is conducted in
the physical parameter space (e.g., lighting). [Wong et al., 2019] recently argue that robustness to Wasserstein
perturbations of the original image is essentially an invariance that should typically exist in classifiers.
Some methods solve the adversarial optimization problem on subspaces, which might lead to specifically
structured adversarial examples. While random subspace [Yan et al., 2019] does not induce specific
perturbation structure, projection on low-frequency domain [Guo et al., 2018] or onto the subspace generated
by the top few singular vectors of the image [Yang et al., 2019, §3.4.] do induce structured adversarial
examples. These approaches aim at reducing the search space of adversarial perturbation for computational
reasons.
Finally, one can consider the problem of adversarial attack generation as an image processing task. A
recent trend to various types of such algorithms, like in conditional or unconditional GAN, style transfer
algorithms, or image translation algorithms, has been to provide more control for the user of the modified or
generated images [Reed et al., 2016, Gatys et al., 2017, Risser et al., 2017, Lu et al., 2017]. Providing a little
more control to the attacker on the generated type of adversarial perturbations stands in that line of works.
Contribution. We study some families of structured norms in the adversarial example setting. This is a
pretense to more generally motivate the relevance of structured attacks (i.e. besides the `p distortion set), that
are largely unexplored. For instance, it challenges the theoretical certification approaches that are stated in
terms of `p neighborhoods. It is also a versatile approach to produce specific modification of the adversarial
images, like (local) bluriness.
Outline. In Section 2 we motivate simple families of norm resulting in structured adversarial perturbations
which can then be leveraged for crafting specific adversarial attacks. In Section 3 we use the conditional
gradient algorithms designed to efficiently solve (1) under the various considered structured norms and we
then report some numerical experiments in Section 4.
2 Structured Distortion Sets
Here we detail some simple structured families of norms that, to the best of our knowledge, have not yet been
explored in the context of adversarial attacks. When solving (1), these lead to specific structures in the outputs,
giving some control, for instance to a potential attacker, on the way the adversarial perturbation alters the test
sample images. In addition, these perturbations can be further adapted to the attacked image by solving the
adversarial problem (1) with a group-norm distortion sets, where the groups are adapted to the image.
In Section 3, we seek to solve the optimization problem (1) with conditional gradient algorithms. When
applicable, this ensures that the early algorithms’ iterates have a specific structure. Indeed, each iteration of
these algorithms requires to solve a Linear Minimization Oracle (LMO). For a direction d and a convex set C,
it is defined as
LMOC(d) ∈ argmin
v∈C
dT v. (3)
The iterates of conditional gradient algorithms are then constructed as (sparse) convex combination of such
solutions. These can always be chosen as extreme points of C. Hence, the specific structure of the solutions
of the LMO is then passed on to the early optimization iterates. In Section 2.2, we review how to leverage on
weighted group norms in order to localize the low-rank perturbations.
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(a) Original (b) S1 = 5 (c) S1 = 10 (d) S1 = 20 (e) S1 = 30
Figure 2: For a test image of CIFAR-10, we computed the various adversarial examples stemming from solving
(1) on the nuclear ball with Frank-Wolfe algorithm. From left to right: original image, adversarial example
with a nuclear radius of S1 = 5, 10, 20, 30. Note that the adversarial examples are already miss-classified
with S1 = 3; here we increase the radius purposely to observe the perturbation on the initial image.
2.1 Low-rank perturbation
We write || · ||S1 for the nuclear norm, the sum of the matrix singular value, a.k.a. the trace norm or the
1-Schatten norm. The nuclear norm has been classically used to promote low-rank solutions of convex
optimization problems [Fazel et al., 2001, Candès and Recht, 2009] such as matrix completion. Here, we
propose to simply consider nuclear balls as distortion sets when searching for adversarial examples in problem
(1). We later explore the various benefit of using this structure. To our knowledge, the low-rank structure is
used in different aspects of some defense techniques but not for adversarial attacks. As an empirical defense
mechanism, Langeberg et al. [2019] add a penalization in the training loss that promotes the low-rank structure
of the convolutional layers filters. Yang et al. [2019] notably propose a pre-processing of the classifier outputs,
which randomly removes some input pixels and further reconstructs it via matrix completion. We hence seek
to solve the following optimization problem
argmin
||x−xori||S1≤
L(f(x), t).
This is just one example among the family of p-Schatten norms || · ||Sp, the p-norm of the singular value
vector. These lead to differently structured adversarial examples and may be interesting to defeat certification
approaches that are stated in terms of `p neighborhoods. The LMO (3) for a nuclear ball of radius ρ is given as
LMO||·||S1≤ρ(M) , ρ U1V
T
1 ,
when the singular decomposition of the matrixM is USV T . The computation of the LMO involves U1 and
V1, i.e., the right and left singular vectors associated to the largest singular value ρ. Others optimization
approaches like PGD, would require the knowledge of the full SVD at each iteration. Note that for q-Schatten
norm (with q > 1) the LMO is also explicit and involve the full singular decomposition (see [Garber and
Hazan, 2015, Lemma 7] for instance).
Finally, we observe that, in practice, the adversarial perturbations add a blurring effect to the initial images,
see Figure 2 for instance. In some potential security scenarios, such perturbations could then be perceived as
simple alterations of the image rather than a malware deformation of it, hence not raising the human attention
(see [Gilmer et al., 2018] for real-world scenarios).
2.2 Group constraints
We now propose group-norms that depend on a partition of the pixels’ coordinates into groups. For instance,
such a partition can be adapted from a segmentation of the sample image. These group-norms are a
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combination of two norms: a local one applied on vectors formed by each group of pixels’ values, and a
global one applied on the vectors of the norms of all the groups. Here, we consider the nuclear norm as the
local norm and the global `1 norm to induce sparsity at the group level. Considering such norms allows to
constrain the type of perturbations further.
Note here that our approach is not the only way to produce structured adversarial perturbations. However,
Conditional Gradient iterates (see Section 3) are all structured according to the structured norm ball with no
other algorithmic modification than the knowledge of the LMO. We can hence easily explore structures in
adversarial examples implementing a trade-off between decrease the adversarial loss and enforcing specific
structures to the perturbation.
NuclearGroupNorm. LetG be an ensemble of groups of pixels’ coordinates of the tensor image of (c, h, w).
Each element g ∈ G is a set of pixel coordinates’. Then for x ∈ Rc×h×w we write, with p ∈ [1,∞[∪{∞},
||x||G,1,p =
∑
g∈G
||x[g]||S(1),
for the G-nuclear group-norm, see for instance [Tomioka and Suzuki, 2013]. When G is a partition of the
pixels, || · ||G,1,S(1) is a norm. The nuclear group-norm allows to localize the blurring effect of the nuclear
norm. Indeed, the LMO of G-nuclear group-norm is given by
LMO||·||G,1,S1≤ρ(M) ,
{
ρ U
(g)
1
(
V
(g)
1
)T
0 otherwise
, (4)
where g∗ = argmax
g∈G
∣∣∣∣M [g]∣∣∣∣
S1
and the singular value decomposition ofM [g] for each group g is given by
U (g)S(g)
(
V (g)
)T . When solving (1) with such norms, each iteration of the conditional gradient will add to
the adversarial perturbation a vertex of the form described by (4), i.e. a matrix of rank-one on the rectangle
defined by the group of pixels in g ∈ G.
Different Distortion Radius per Group. When perturbing an image, modification in the pixel regions
with high variance are typically harder to perceive than pixels modification in low variance regions. This was
leveraged on in [Luo et al., 2018] or in the σ-map of [Croce and Hein, 2019, §2.2.]. Weighted nuclear group
norms allow to search adversarial perturbations with different distortion radius across the image. With some
wg > 0, the weighted nuclear group norm is defined as
||x||G,1,S(1),w =
∑
g∈G
wg||x[g]||S(1),
and the LMO for weighted nuclear group-norm is then obtained as
LMO||·||G,1,S1≤ρ(M) ,

ρ
wg∗
U
(g∗)
1
(
V
(g∗)
1
)T on group of pixels g∗
0 otherwise
,
where g∗ = argmax
g∈G
1
wg
∣∣∣∣M [g]∣∣∣∣
S1
and the singular value decomposition ofM [g] for each group g is given
by U (g)S(g)
(
V (g)
)T . In particular, this means that the solution corresponding to the group associated with g
have a nuclear radius of ρwg and the weights wg allow to control the distortion in each group of pixels.
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Structured Attacks and Certification. Some defense methods aim at certifying that some neural network
classifiers are constant in balls around test images [Wong and Kolter, 2017, Raghunathan et al., 2018b,a]. In
particular, these methods seek at escaping the cat and mice game between empirical attacks and defenses
methods. However, it is not yet clear how these scale to large datasets and neural architectures, for instance,
[Raghunathan et al., 2018b] only provide certifiable robustness on MNIST with `∞ = 0.1.
Besides, these methods guarantee certifiable robustness in terms `p-norms perturbations. Although
norms are equivalents in the finite-dimensional space of images, their guarantee may become shallow under a
different measure of the distortion set. This was pointed out with Wasserstein distortion sets in [Wong et al.,
2019, §5.3.].
3 Structure Enhancing Algorithm for Adversarial Examples
We apply the Frank-Wolfe algorithms [Frank and Wolfe, 1956], a.k.a. conditional gradient algorithms [Levitin
and Polyak, 1966], for problem (1). These algorithms have known a recent revival in constrained optimization
problems for machine learning. This is notably due to their low cost computational cost per iterations [Jaggi,
2013] as well as the many related theoretical and practical open questions, like linear convergence on polytopes
[Guélat and Marcotte, 1986, Garber and Hazan, 2013a,b, Lacoste-Julien and Jaggi, 2013, 2015], convergence
on strongly convex set [Levitin and Polyak, 1966, Demyanov and Rubinov, 1970, Dunn, 1979, Garber and
Hazan, 2015] or uniformly convex sets [Kerdreux and d’Aspremont, 2020].
On specific constraint structures, such as the one developed in Section 2, conditional gradient algorithms
naturally trade off the convergence accuracy with the structure of the early iterates. Note also that for the
case of large-scale nuclear norm regularization in convex optimization, the Frank-Wolfe algorithm has been
extensively studied [Jaggi and Sulovsky`, 2010, Lee et al., 2010, Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2011, Harchaoui et al.,
2012, Dudik et al., 2012, Allen-Zhu et al., 2017, Garber et al., 2018]. Many variations [Freund et al., 2017,
Cheung and Li, 2017] exist which leverage the facial properties (see [Freund et al., 2017, Theorem 3] or
originally from [So, 1990]) of the nuclear ball (which is not a polytope nor a strongly convex set).
Algorithm 1 Vanilla Frank-Wolfe
Input: Original image x0
for t = 0, · · · , T do
st = LMOC
(−∇f(xt)).
γt = LineSearch(xt, st − xt)
xt+1 = (1− γt)xt + γtst
end for
For all the distortion set we consider, the LMO is explicit. While we do not focus on computational
efficiency, we note that the computation of the LMO has a low computational requirement as opposed to
projection based approaches. Indeed it require only the first singular vectors as opposed to proximal steps
which require the full SVD. Provided access (when applicable) to an upper-bound L of the adversarial loss
Lipschitz constant in (1), we use the short step size rule γt = clip[0,1](〈−∇f(xt), st − xt〉/L||st − xt||2).
Chen et al. [2018] consider using zero-order Frank-Wolfe algorithm for solving adversarial problems like (1)
but in the black-box setting.
When the objective functions are non-convex, e.g. with adversarial losses, injecting noise may be
beneficial. For instance, this can be done either via random starts or via randomized block-coordinate methods.
With some restriction Kerdreux et al. [2018] propose a version of Frank-Wolfe that solves linear minimization
oracles on random subsets of the constraint sets. For the nuclear group norm, the sampling scheme could be
done at the group-level. For instance, we consider the nuclear group norm with one group per channel, i.e.
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||x||color,S1 =
∑3
c=1 ||xc||S1 where xc is one of the image channels. We experiment this approach in Section
4.
Here, we did not consider the constraints that the images iterates should belong to the [0, 1]d box constraints.
Instead, we clamp the last iterate to belong to the box constraints. This does not guarantee the convergence
to a saddle point but removes the need to compute the Linear Minimization Oracle over the intersection of
two sets, which is non-trivial. We are ultimately interested in the effective success rate of the attack that we
explore in the subsequent section.
4 Numerical Experiments
This section aims at evaluating the success rate in different scenarios of adversarial examples stemming
from the application of Frank-Wolfe algorithms to the adversarial problem (1) with (group) nuclear balls as
distortion sets, which we refer as FWnucl.
Experiments Goal. We tested FWnucl white-box attack against two baselines of defenses for untargeted
attacks. The first is Madry et al. [2017], the state-of-the-art defense against white-box attacks. It uses the
training images augmented with adversarial perturbations to train the network.
The second one Yang et al. [2019] leverages matrix estimation techniques as a pre-processing step; each
image is altered by randomly masking various proportions of the image pixels’ and then reconstructed using
matrix estimation. For a given training image, this produces a group of images that are used during training,
see [Yang et al., 2019, §2.3.] for more details. This provides a non-differentiable defense technique, i.e.
a method that cannot be straightforwardly optimized via back-propagation algorithms, and was reported
to be robust against methods in [Athalye et al., 2018] by circumventing the obfuscated gradients defenses.
Qualitatively it leverages a structural difference between the low-rank structure of natural images and the
adversarial perturbations that are not specifically designed to share the same structures. A key motivation of
our work then is to propose adversarial examples with specific structures, serving at least as a sanity check for
defense approaches in the spirit of [Yang et al., 2019].
We report the attack success rates of FWnucl along with those of classical attack methods like Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. [2014], and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Madry et al.
[2017], both of which being different methods to solve the same adversarial problem (1) where the distortion
set is the `∞ ball. For each technique, we report accuracy as the percentage of adversarial examples that are
classified correctly. These numerical experiments demonstrate that the attack success rates for FWnucl are
comparable to the classical ones in an imperceptibility regime while also retaining specific structures in the
perturbation.
Experiment settings. We assess accuracy of networks on MNIST and CIFAR-10 testsets. For ImageNet
we randomly selected 4000 from the ImageNet validation set that is correctly classified. As classically done
in previous works, for MNIST, we use the LeNet model with two convolutional layers similar to Madry et al.
[2017] and SmallCNN with four convolutional layers followed by three fully connected layers as in Carlini and
Wagner [2017]. For CIFAR-10 dataset we use ResNet-18 and its wide version WideResNet and ResNet-50.
Nuclear Attacks Structures. In MNIST dataset there is no texture besides the digits’ active pixels
representing the figures. In particular, attacks that tend to perturb all pixels are not good candidates as they
require low distortion parameters to be imperceptible. This is, for instance, the case of the Frank-Wolfe attack
with nuclear ball distortion sets. Indeed nuclear adversarial examples perturb nearly all the pixels, with values
ranging from 1 to 5 (with respect to 255). This is because at each iteration Frank-Wolfe algorithms add a
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Table 1: MNIST and CIFAR-10 extensive white-box attack results. FWnucl 20 ∗: FWnucl with S1 = 1.
FWnucl 20+: FWnucl with S1 = 3. On MNIST (resp. CIFAR-10) PGD and FGSM have a total perturbation
scale of 76.5/255(0.3) (resp. 8/255 (0.031)), and step size 2.55/255(0.01) (resp. 2/255(0.01)). PGD runs for
20 iterations. We reproduce the ME-Net and Madry defense with same training hyper-parameters.
Network Training Clean Accuracy under attack
Model FWnucl 20 ∗ FWnucl 20+ PGD 20 FGSM
MNIST
LeNET Madry 98.38 95.26 92.76 95.79 96.59ME-Net 99.24 97.63 75.41 74.88 46.18
SmallCNN Madry 99.12 98.19 96.66 95.77 97.95ME-Net 99.42 89.56 78.65 76.84 54.09
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18 Madry 81.25 44.28 3.06 49.95 55.91ME-Net 92.09 29.66 4.01 4.99 44.80
WideResNet Madry 85.1 43.16 2.82 52.49 59.06ME-Net 92.09 40.09 16.04 12.73 59.33
ResNet-50 Madry 87.03 40.97 2.64 53.01 61.44ME-Net 92.09 47.66 17.81 9.14 58.51
rank-one matrix to the perturbation. These rank one matrices stem from the right and left singular vector of
the initial matrix and generally involve many of the image pixels.
In Table 2 we report the mean `2, and nuclear norms of the adversarial noise over all attacks in Table
1 for the CIFAR-10 dataset (see the Appendix for MNIST dataset). Our method with S1 = 1 generates
perturbations with almost 7x and 10x lower `2 norm for the MNIST dataset. Interestingly, the adversarial
examples for FWnucl show significantly lower nuclear norm.
In Figure 3 we report the accuracy of adversarially trained networks over MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets
when attacked with FWnucl. It shows the network’s accuracy at each iteration of a FWnucl attack with various
nuclear norm radius S1 = 1, 3, 5.
Figure 4 summarizes the results for FWnucl with varying for standard and robust model on CIFAR-10.
The FWnucl algorithm noticeably drops the accuracy rate by increasing the radius S1. The performance of
Table 2: Comparison of the white-box attacks for CIFAR-10 on ResNet-18 adversarially trained. PGD, on the
`∞ ball, and FGSM have a total perturbation scale of 8/255 (0.031), and step size 2/255(0.01). FWnucl 20 ∗:
FWnucl with S1 = 1. FWnucl 20+: FWnucl with S1 = 3.
ResNet-18 WideResNet ResNet-50
Attack Mean `2 Mean ‖·‖S1 Mean `2 Mean ‖·‖S1 Mean `2 Mean ‖·‖S1
FWnucl 20 ∗ 1.38 0.91 1.36 0.90 1.31 0.91
FWnucl 20+ 3.37 2.72 3.24 2.62 3.00 2.65
PGD 20 1.68 3.88 1.68 3.97 1.66 3.89
FGSM 1.73 4.04 1.73 4.04 1.73 4.10
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(b)
Figure 3: Accuracy of robust models, MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10 (right), versus the number of steps in PGD
and FWnucl attacks when varying the nuclear ball radius on the latter.
different FWnucl methods is slightly different, as more FWnucl steps may gain better performances.
Imperceptibility nuclear threshold. We illustrate in Figure 5 some adversarial examples generated by
FWnucl, for three different values of epsilon. The imperceptibility threshold depends on the dataset. On
CIFAR-10, we qualitatively observed that with S1 = 1, all adversarial examples are perceptually identical to
the original images. Also as the dataset becomes more complex, the tolerance of imperceptibility to nuclear
ball radius values S1 increases; on ImageNet the imperceptibility threshold is qualitatively for S1 = 10. In
Figure 6, we observe that the perturbations are particularly congregated around important regions (i.e., body,
head), although there is not a universal configuration to detect specific features that are the most important for
the network. While the noise generated by PGD attack exhibits abrupt changes in pixel intensities (see Figure
1), the perturbation from FW has a continuous variations in pixel values. In addition, the number of non-zero
pixel values for PGD and FGSM on ImageNet is almost 11x and 14x larger, respectively than the number of
non-zero pixel intensities for FWnucl with S1 = 1.
It is important to characterize the type of deformation that arise with radii above the imperceptibility
threshold as the imperceptibility regimes are not the only security scenario. In particular accuracy of robust
networks quickly drop to zero in these regimes, see Figure 3-4, facilitating the attacks. In the nuclear ball case,
as the radius S1 of the nuclear ball increases, the perturbation becomes perceptible with a blurring effect.
Structure in the adversarial examples can be leveraged to create specific perceptible deformation effects that
look natural to humans.
Transferability. In Table 3 we investigate the transferability of FWnucl adversarial examples over different
architectures for ImageNet. This table shows that there should be some similar structural pattern between
independent architectures that FWnucl employs, but the adversaries are mainly network dependent. In Figure
7, we illustrate how the adversarial nuclear structure vary from one network to another for the same image; in
particular the perturbation continuously concentrate around the important regions of the image with however
varying layout and pattern of perturbation for each network.
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(b)
Figure 4: Accuracy of standard model (left) and robust model of Madry (right) on ResNet-18 for CIFAR-10,
versus the nuclear ball radius when varying the number of steps.
(a)
Figure 5: FWnucl adversarial examples for the CIFAR-10 dataset for different radii. The fooling label is
shown on the image.
Table 3: Fooling rates of FWnucl adversarial perturbations between several models for 4000 samples from
ImageNet. The row indicates the source model and the column indicates the target model.
ResNet-18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
ResNet-18 100 18.15 12.91
DenseNet121 16.56 99.30 11.74
GoogLeNet 15.03 12.37 99.40
10
(a) Bathtub (b) Basset (c) Bouvier des Flandres
(d) Golf Ball (e) Hog (f) Custard Apple
Figure 6: The images display some structural pattern of FWnucl perturbations for the ImageNet dataset on
DenseNet121 architecture for various level of distortion, standardly trained. Observe that the adversarial
perturbed pixels are accumulated on the areas containing semantic information about the image. FWnucl is
conducted with S1 = 5 and 20 iterations.
(a) ResNet-18 (b) DenseNet121 (c) GoogLeNet
Figure 7: General layout of the FWnucl perturbations for ImageNet across three different architectures.
5 Conclusion
We consider adversarial attacks beyond `p distortion set. We propose a simple optimization approach
producing structured adversarial examples with non-`p distortion sets. First, it challenges the theoretical
certification approaches that so far are given in `p norm terms. Also, it allows an attacker to design perceptible
adversarial examples with specific characteristics, like localized blurriness. Finally, in the imperceptible
regime, some defensive pre-processing techniques may rely on a lack of certain patterns in the adversarial
perturbations to destroy it. Evaluating robustness against various structured adversarial examples then seems
to be a reasonable defense sanity check.
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Supplementary Materials
A More on structured norms
In [Amini et al., 2017, §2.3.] introduce ΣG a 1-group-p-Schatten norms where the group can overlaps. In this
case also it is possible to access the LMO leveraging on the knowledge of the dual norm ΣG
Σ◦G(M) = max
g∈G
∣∣∣∣M [g]∣∣∣∣
S(q)
,
where S(q) with 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
From [Pierucci, 2017, (2.5),(2.6)] shows that the group-nuclear norms || · ||G,1,S(1) are convex surrogates
of some group-rank function and as such enforce solution that are low-rank on some groups.
We stated the LMO q-Schatten for q = 1, which corresponds to the trace-norm or nuclear norm, and
q ∈]1,+∞[ separately. The LMO for the Schatten norm with q = +∞ is given by
LMO||·||S(∞)≤ρ , ρUV
T ,
whereM = USV T with U and V the matrix of left and right normalized singular vectors.
So far we only considered sparsity (at the group level) inducing group-norm, but more general norms can
be simply written with r ∈]1,+∞[ and p ∈ [1,+∞[
||x||G,r,S(p) =
(∑
g∈G
||x[g]||rS(p)
)1/r
,
however, sparsity of the global adversarial perturbation is something which is not interesting to loose as it
concentrates the perturbation only on some areas.
B More on numerical results
Table 4: MNIST and CIFAR-10 extensive white-box attack results against standardly trained models. FWnucl
20 ∗: FWnucl with  = 1. FWnucl 20+: FWnucl with  = 3.
Network Clean Accuracy under attack
FWnucl 20 ∗ FWnucl 20+ PGDnucl 20 PGD 20 FGSM
MNIST
LeNET 99.32 93.82 36.24 98.01 0.25 38.62
SmallCNN 99.47 94.21 76.9 97.32 20.02 90.63
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18 93.94 2.77 0.00 24.22 0.00 18.60
WideResNet 95.28 3.65 0.00 25.18 0.00 26.86
ResNet-50 93.22 2.99 0.00 19.35 0.00 22.26
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(a) S1 = 3 (b) S1 = 5
Figure 8: Showing the distribution of number of modified pixels between a CIFAR10 test image with integer
pixel values in [0, 255] and a perturbed image in the same format. We use 5000 images in CIFAR10 test set.
Each image is perturbed via adding S1uvT to the normalized initial test image and then by unnormalizing
and clamping it to integers values between [0, 255]. u and v are the right and left singular vectors associated
to the largest singular value. In Frank-Wolfe nuclear the Frank-Wolfe vertex that are added to the perturbation
are of the form of S1uvT where (u, v) are singular-vectors associated to the largest singular value of the
perturbed image along the iterations.
Table 5: MNIST and CIFAR-10 extensive white-box attack results with S1 = 5.
Network Training Accuracy under attack
Model FWnucl 10 FWnucl 20 FWnucl 50 FWnucl 100
MNIST
LeNET Madry 92.67 90.39 87.84 86.61ME-NET 50.60 39.02 30.12 26.65
SmallCNN Madry 96.34 94.5 92.17 91.02ME-NET 63.75 60.98 55.98 54.65
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18 Madry 0.74 0.19 0.04 0.01ME-NET 3.21 0.80 0.29 0.10
WideResNet Madry 0.81 0.19 0.03 0.02ME-NET 14.19 8.32 4.42 3.29
ResNet-50 Madry 1.09 0.25 0.06 0.03ME-NET 16.40 9.17 4.28 2.89
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Table 6: Comparison of the white-box attacks for MNIST on SmallCNN adversarially trained. PGD, on the
`∞ ball, and FGSM have a total perturbation scale of 76.5/255(0.3), and step size 2.55/255(0.01). PGD runs
for 20 iterations.
LeNet SmallCNN
Attack Mean `2 Mean ‖·‖S2 Mean `2 Mean ‖·‖S2
FWnucl 20 (S1 = 1) 0.45 0.75 0.45 0.80
FWnucl 20 (S1 = 3) 0.93 1.91 1.00 2.14
PGD 20 3.87 16.12 4.67 18.98
FGSM 6.15 24.92 3.57 12.17
Table 7: Fooling rates of FWnucl adversarial perturbations between several models for CIFAR-10 test set.
The row indicates the source models on which adversarial examples are grafted and the column indicates the
target model on which these attacks are evaluated. These models are not adversarially trained. FWnucl run
for 20 iterations with S1 = 5.
ResNet-18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
ResNet-18 97.48 86.00 84.64
DenseNet121 91.31 98.36 90.45
GoogLeNet 83.55 86.03 98.37
Table 9: MNIST and CIFAR-10 extensive white-box attack results with random initialization. FWnucl 20 ∗:
FWnucl with  = 1. FWnucl 20+: FWnucl with  = 3.
Network Training Clean Accuracy under attack
Model FWnucl 20 ∗ FWnucl 20+ PGD 20 FGSM CW
MNIST
LeNET Madry 98.38 95.00 85.37 95.79 96.59 98.38ME-NET 99.24 97.02 52.63 74.88 46.18 99.00
SmallCNN Madry 99.12 98.03 92.35 95.77 97.95 99.12ME-NET 99.42 89.04 71.75 76.84 54.09 91.44
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18 Madry 81.25 34.64 0.45 49.95 55.91 78.61ME-NET 92.09 29.66 4.01 4.99 44.80 79.57
WideResNet Madry 85.1 32.3 0.33 52.49 59.06 82.69ME-NET 92.09 24.16 4.07 12.73 59.33 80.89
ResNet-50 Madry 87.03 29.24 0.31 53.01 61.44 84.72ME-NET 92.09 28.49 4.09 9.14 58.51 83.21
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Table 8: Comparisons of the attacks for projected gradiet descent with nuclear norm (PGDnucl). MNIST
and CIFAR-10 extensive white-box attack results for PGDnucl. PGDnucl 20 ∗: PGDnucl 20 with S1 = 1;
PGDnucl 20+: PGDnucl 20 with S1 = 3; PGDnucl 20#: PGDnucl 20 with S1 = 5
Network Training Accuracy under attack
Model PGDnucl 20 ∗ PGDnucl 20+ PGDnucl 20#
MNIST
LeNET Madry 95.36 87.48 69.50ME-NET 98.21 97.83 94.78
SmallCNN Madry 98.15 93.20 80.51ME-NET 88.35 85.33 76.23
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18 Madry 78.38 74.46 58.57ME-NET 87.21 76.28 58.58
WideResNet Madry 81.49 76.38 –ME-NET 89.08 74.74 54.37
ResNet-50 Madry 82.87 77.19 60.68ME-NET 87.26 78.29 62.90
(a)
Figure 9: FWnucl adversarial examples for the MNIST dataset for different radii, (a) original images (first
row), adversarial example generated by (b) FWnucl with S1 = 1 (second row), (c) FWnucl with S1 = 3
(third row) and (d) FWnucl with S1 = 5 (third row). The fooling label is shown on the image.
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Figure 10: Adversarial examples on MNIST dataset against the Madry defense (a) original images (first row),
adversarial examples generated by (b) FWnucl (second row), (c) PGDnucl (third row), (d) PGD (fourth row)
and (e) FGSM (fifth row); the fooling label is shown on bottom-right of each image, and the l2 norm of
adversarial noise is written below each image.
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(a) stole (b) stole
(c) stole (d) stole
(a) FWnucl (b) PGDnucl
(c) PGD (d) FGSM
Figure 11: ResNet-50 adversarial examples with the histogram of non-zero pixel intensities corresponding to
the attack perturbations for the Angora original image label.
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(a) tray (b) hamster
(c) Irish setter (d) Persian cat
Figure 12: ResNt-50 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the attack
perturbations for the original image with the label hamster.
(a) clog (b) ski mask
(c) ski mask (d) dumbbell
Figure 13: ResNet-50 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the attack
perturbations for the original image with the label dumbbell.
22
(a) patio (b) steel drum
(c) patio (d) folding chair
Figure 14: ResNet-50 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the attack
perturbations for the original image with the label steel drum.
(a) beach wagon (b) beach wagon
(c) black stork (d) beach wagon
Figure 15: ResNet-50 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the attack
perturbations for the original image with the label limousine.
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(a) barometer (b) wall clock
(c) wardrobe (d) wardrobe
Figure 16: ResNet-50 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the attack
perturbations for the original image with the label wall clock.
(a) flagpole (b) liner
(c) bath towel (d) fountain 3.34
Figure 17: ResNet-50 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the attack
perturbations for the original image with the label liner.
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(a) car wheel (b) dome
(c) dome (d) wall clock
Figure 18: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label safety pin.
(a) barrow (b) barrow
(c) barrow (d) barrow
Figure 19: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label greenhouse.
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(a) parachute (b) black stork
(c) maze (d) crane
Figure 20: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label black stork.
(a) vacuum (b) rocking chair
(c) rocking chair (d) rocking chair
Figure 21: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label folding chair.
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(a) television (b) white stork
(c) monitor (d) white stork
Figure 22: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label crane.
(a) pickup truck (b) pickup truck
(c) racing car (d) racing car
Figure 23: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label limousine.
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(a) vault (b) vault
(c) vault (d) vault
Figure 24: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label organ.
(a) packet (b) packet
(c) plastic bag (d) bucket
Figure 25: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label loupe.
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(a) bucket (b) carton
(c) horizontal bar (d) iron
Figure 26: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label necklace.
(a) knot (b) wool
(c) mitten (d) mitten
Figure 27: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label Angora.
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(a) plate rack (b) upright
(c) abacus (d) plate rack
Figure 28: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label upright.
(a) Staffordshire bullterrier (b) English foxhound
(c) beagle (d) beagle
Figure 29: DenseNet121 adversarial examples with the heat map of pixel intensities corresponding to the
attack perturbations for the original image with the label English foxhound.
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